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Abstract 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable credit for low-income workers that is 
mainly targeted at families with children. This study uses the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation’s (SIPP) topical modules on Assets & Liabilities to examine the effects of EITC 
expansions during the early 1990s on the unsecured debt of the households of single mothers. 
We use two difference-in-differences comparisons over the study period 1988 to 1999, first 
comparing single mothers to single childless women, and then comparing single mothers with 
two or more children to single mothers with exactly one child. In both cases we find that the 
EITC expansions are associated with a relative decline in the unsecured debt of affected 
households of single mothers. This suggests that single mothers may have used part of their 
EITC to limit the growth of their unsecured debt during this period. 
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Introduction 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit for low-income workers. 
It is mainly targeted toward low-income families with children with incomes up to about twice 
the poverty line. To beneficiaries, the credit represents a large, annual, tax-free income transfer. 
Only a few studies, though, have examined how beneficiaries allocate their EITC. Most utilize 
evidence from non-representative surveys of recipients (Smeeding, Phillips & O’Conner, 2000; 
Rhine, Su, Osaki & Lee, 2005; Spader, Ratcliffe & Stegman, 2005; Mendenhall, Edin, Crowley, 
Sykes, Tach, King & Kriz, 2010; Romich & Weisner, 2000). A few analyze nationally 
representative data to compare groups that include likely beneficiaries, such as single mothers, to 
groups that are unlikely to benefit, such as single childless women (Meyer & Sullivan, 2004; 
Barrow & McGranahan, 2000). 
We extend this line of research by using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation’s (SIPP) topical modules on Assets & Liabilities to examine associations between 
the major EITC expansions of the 1990s and the unsecured debt of households of working-age 
single mothers, during the years 1988-1999. We utilize a difference-in-differences approach, 
with two separate comparisons that have been used extensively in the literature to examine the 
effects of the EITC. First we compare the unsecured debt of single mothers to single childless 
women, over time. Then we compare the unsecured debt of single mothers with two or more 
children (who received a larger EITC increase during our study period) to those with exactly one 
child. In both cases, we find evidence that the EITC expansions are associated with a relative 
decline in unsecured debt among households of single mothers during this period. This suggests 
that single mothers may have used some portion of their EITC to limit the growth of unsecured 
debt, bucking the national trend of rising unsecured debt during our study time period. 
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Background & Literature Review 
At nearly $58 billion in total credits for tax year 2009 (serving 26 million tax filing 
units), the EITC is the federal government’s most expensive means-tested income maintenance 
program. In addition, 22 states plus the District of Columbia have their own EITCs. Available 
evidence suggests that most EITC eligible taxpayers receive the credit (Scholz, 1994; Currie, 
2006). Since 1984, EITC benefits have not been included in eligibility calculations for other 
public welfare programs. Thus, unlike most sources of income, increases in the EITC do not 
trigger reductions in other public benefits beyond what is related to increased labor force 
participation induced by the EITC. 
The credit amount increases as labor market earnings increase, up to a plateau, where it 
reaches its maximum level. The credit remains at its maximum amount until it begins to decrease 
in the phase-out range, finally falling to zero at an annual income level around 200 percent of 
poverty. A number of studies have considered the EITC’s effects on labor force participation 
(Dahl, DeLeire & Schwabish, 2009; Ellwood, 2000; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Hotz & Scholz, 
2003; Eissa & Liebman, 1996). These studies generally find that the EITC has a positive effect 
on the labor force participation of single mothers (at the extensive margin—results for the 
intensive margin are ambiguous), and a negative effect on the labor force participation of low-
wage working married women (Hoynes, 2008). 
A few studies examine how families allocate dollars from their EITC refund. Smeeding 
and colleagues surveyed 650 EITC beneficiaries who used a nonprofit tax preparation service in 
the Chicago region in 1998. They found that 70 percent of EITC recipients planned to use part of 
their refund for “economic- and social-mobility” purposes, such as saving (33 percent) or 
purchasing a car (19 percent), while 69 percent planned to use part for “making-ends-meet” uses, 
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such as rent or utility bills, and making other purchases. The top priority for about half the 
sample was to pay bills, while only 12 percent listed saving as their top priority. Mendenhall et 
al. (2010) interviewed 194 EITC recipients from Illinois and Massachusetts, at two points: tax 
filing in 2007, and six months later. Among all recipients, about half of the total refund went 
toward current consumption, and about 24 percent went toward paying back debt, overdue bills, 
or prepaying bills. At the 6-month mark, 6.7 percent of recipient’s refunds remained in savings. 
These findings are similar to those from a survey of IRS Volunteer Tax Assistance (VITA) 
Program clients in North Carolina (Spader et al., 2005). 
An ethnographic study in Wisconsin found that beneficiaries tended to use the EITC to 
make large purchases or increase consumption (Romich & Weisner, 2000). Barrow and 
McGranahan (2000) analyzed Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data from 1982-1996 and 
found that the EITC was associated with increased consumer spending, most obviously on 
durable goods, during February—when most recipients receive their EITC benefit. Meyer and 
Sullivan (2004) also use CES and find that, between 1984 and 2000, the overall consumption of 
households headed by single mothers grew relative to households of single childless women and 
married mothers, which they attribute to changes in the EITC, as well as welfare reform and 
other changes to the tax code affecting this population. 
In sum, the previous studies offer strong evidence that recipients spend a portion of their 
EITC benefits on current consumption (Mendenhall et al. 2010; Meyer & Sullivan, 2004; Barrow 
& McGranahan 2000; Romich & Wiesner, 2000, Smeeding et al., 2000). In this study, we 
explored the extent to which EITC recipients use their refunds for unsecured debt reduction. Like 
Meyer and Sullivan, we focus on single mothers, the primary beneficiaries of the EITC, and we 
focus on the 12-year period 1988 through 1999, which straddles a significant expansionary 
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period for the EITC. This period also coincided with a substantial rise in unsecured debt. Credit 
card debt, for example, grew by 315 percent between 1989 and 2006, to $876 billion (Garcia, 
2007). Growth in access to credit cards and credit card debt has been greatest among poor 
households (Sullivan, 2008). 
We hypothesized that the major EITC expansions of the early 1990s were associated with 
a reduction in the unsecured debt of households with single mothers. While the EITC may have 
an ambiguous effect on secured debt—by promoting vehicle or home purchase—the evidence 
suggests that the effect on unsecured debt should be unambiguous: single mothers may use their 
tax refund to pay down existing unsecured debt, such as back bills. Or, they may use their refund 
to avoid new debt by making large purchases with cash instead of credit (Mendenhall et al. 
2010). 
Data and Method 
 We utilize the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally 
representative sample of the civilian non-institutionalized population in the United States. During 
each panel, interviews are conducted every four months for each intervening month, gathering 
data on demographics, welfare, family income and composition, labor force participation, and 
program participation. We merge data from the monthly survey with responses from Assets & 
Liabilities topical modules in the 1987 SIPP panel (wave 4); the 1990 panel (wave 4); the 1991 
panel (wave 7); the1992 panel (wave 4); the 1993 panel (wave 7); and the 1996 panel (waves 3, 
6, 9 and 12). 
This SIPP topical module has detailed asset and liability questions, including actual 
monetary values. The SIPP’s relatively large sample size allows researchers to study specific 
sub-populations. Comparison studies find that the SIPP does a good job of capturing the wealth 
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of low-income households, relative to other major surveys (Czajka et. al, 2003; Ratcliffe et. al, 
2008).1 All asset and liability estimates are reported in real 2005 dollars. We follow Meyer and 
Rosembaum (2001) and adjust dollar values using the monthly personal consumption 
expenditure index and state cost-of-living differences index developed by the National Research 
Council (1995). We cluster all standard errors by state to account for the SIPP’s stratified survey 
design. The SIPP’s measure of unsecured debt is broad, including debt from credit cards and 
store bills, unsecured loans obtained through a bank or credit union, and other debts including 
medical bills not covered by insurance, money owed to private individuals, and other debts not 
covered.2 
Our study population is single adult mothers (ages 19-55) with minor children, because 
they receive roughly 60 percent of total EITC credit dollars (Meyer & Sullivan, 2004). We 
examine two difference-in-differences comparisons. We first compare single childless women to 
single mothers because single mothers were differentially affected by the EITC expansions of the 
early 1990s, while the two groups faced similar labor market conditions.3 We then compare 
single mothers with exactly one child to single mothers with two or more children, who received 
a substantially larger targeted increase in their EITC benefit during our study period.4 In all 
analyses, we compare the outcomes of the experimental group to those of the control group 
                                                
1 The only potential problems that could affect quality are attrition across waves and item non-response on particular 
asset and liability items.  Missing values are imputed within bracketed categories, but these methods are less 
accurate when variables have high non-response rates. 
2 The SIPP Asset and Liabilities survey instrument can be found at 
www.census.gov/sipp/top_mod/1996/quests/wave3/assetlia.html 
3 This comparison is used in numerous difference-in-differences studies of the labor market participation effects of 
the EITC, see Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001, and was used in a difference-in-differences study of the impact of the 
EITC and other public program and tax code changes on consumption by Meyer & Sullivan, 2004. It should be 
noted that the EITC first offered a credit to low-wage workers with no children in tax year 1994, which likely would 
have benefited single childless women. However, this credit remains quite small, relative to what was received by 
families with children. By the end of our study period (1999), filers with no children could receive a maximum 
credit of about $400, while the maximum for filers with one child was about $2,700 and $4,450 for filers with two 
or more children (all adjusted to 2005 dollars). 
4 This comparison is used in a difference-in-differences study of labor market earnings effects of the EITC by Dahl 
et al., 2009. 
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across the study time period. This is done in an effort to control for changing macroeconomic 
and other conditions that might drive outcomes during the period, which would have likely 
affected the experimental and control groups similarly. 
A limitation of the SIPP Assets & Liabilities topical module is that variables are collected 
at the household level. Therefore, for single mothers who cohabit—even if they are the 
household head—the assets and liabilities information may include data from other adult 
household respondents as well. We think it is important to examine results for all single 
women—even those who are not household heads—because research emphasizes the high 
prevalence of co-habitation for single mothers (Folk, 1996; Bumpass & Raley, 1995). Thus, 
restricting our results only to household heads may risk biasing our results, as household heads 
may be different from other single mothers in non-representative ways. Thus, in all of our 
analyses, we consider results for all single women, as well as household heads only. In 
sensitivity analyses, we attempt to control for the presence of other adults in the household. 
We focus our investigation around the exogenous changes to the EITC that are straddled 
by the twelve-year study period 1988-1999. This study period closely mirrors the ones used by 
Dahl et al., 2009 and Meyer & Sullivan, 2004. Figure 1 shows the maximum EITC credit in real 
2005 dollars for the period 1985-2006. The credit for 1990 (realized in 1991) was $1,424. By 
1995 (realized in 1996), this had grown to $2,683 for families with one child, and nearly tripled 
for families with 2 or more children to $3,985. Our analyses are conducted on data from the SIPP 
Assets & Liabilities topical modules on estimates of household assets and liabilities for 1988, 
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1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999.5 This includes multiple data points before and after the 
EITC expansions under study were implemented. 
This analysis faces concerns about the potential confounding effects of the 1996 welfare 
reform that ended the entitlement for cash welfare in the U.S. However, the majority of states did 
not implement their TANF program until 1997, while the EITC expansions under study went 
into effect earlier (Crouse, 1999). Thus, we would expect for the effect of the expanded EITC to 
first appear in 1996, after the large expansions of the EITC credit would have been realized by 
families, but before welfare reform was fully implemented. Welfare waiver programs 
implemented prior to 1997 varied in size and character, with many limited to certain counties. 
Thus, we think it is unlikely that these programs, on the whole, could lead to clear changes in the 
assets and liabilities levels of our study population, on a national level. Still, in our multivariate 
models we control for the possible confounding effects of welfare reform in two ways. First, we 
control for the presence of waiver programs and the implementation of state-level TANF 
programs by state-month-year. More importantly, our second difference-in-differences 
comparison of single mothers with exactly one child to those with multiple children should 
mitigate this concern, as these two groups were similarly affected by the 1996 welfare reform, 
but differentially affected by the EITC expansions under study. 
Relative to single childless women, we hypothesize that the unsecured debt of single 
mothers will fall over the period 1988-1999. Further, the EITC expanded specifically for families 
with 2+ children at the end of our period, 1994-1996. Thus, we would further expect the 
unsecured debt of single mothers with two or more children to fall in the final years of our 
analysis, relative to single mothers with one child. We further hypothesize that, during the early 
                                                
5 The Assets and Liabilities topical module was also administered in 1998. However, the point estimates for our 
study populations for 1998 were associated with extremely large standard errors, making them essentially 
meaningless. Thus, we dropped data from this year. 
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years of our study period, the unsecured debt of single mothers with two or more children should 
increase relative to that of single mothers with exactly one child, and then decrease in 1996 and 
later. This is because during the earlier years of our study period, these groups received similarly 
sized credit amounts, which would have been a larger proportion of the average budget of a 
single mother family with one child. However, when the credit was increased specifically for 
families with multiple children, this should have led to a relative improvement of the position of 
single mothers with multiple children. 
For multivariate analyses, we utilize the standard difference-in-differences approach, 
with two separate models. 𝑈𝐷!,! = 𝑋𝛽!,! + 𝜙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!,! + 𝛾𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟!,! + 𝜆 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟!,! ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!,! + 𝜀!,! (1) 𝑈𝐷!,! = 𝑋𝛽!,! + 𝜙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!,! + 𝛾2  𝑜𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛!,! + 𝜆 2  𝑜𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛!,! ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!,! + 𝜀!,! 
            (2) 
In both equations, UD represents the unsecured debt of individual i at time t. X is a vector 
of individual and environmental characteristics that include race and ethnicity, age (in dummy 
categories for age groups <25, 25-34, 35-44, and 45-55), education (college graduate, 0,1), 
whether a state welfare waiver program was in effect (0,1), whether a state TANF program was 
in effect (0,1), and region dummies. Year indicates the year of the observation. 
For both models, the sample is restricted to the experimental group and the control group. 
In equation 1, the experimental group is single mothers, while the control group is single 
childless women. The singlemother term is an indicator that the respondent is a single mother. 
The interaction term singlemother*year is the difference-in-differences estimator. With these 
interactions included, the stand-alone singlemother indicator comes to represent the difference in 
unsecured debt between single mothers and single childless women in the base year of 1988. The 
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interaction terms then represent the change in the differential between these two groups in the 
non-base years of the study. 
Equation 2 follows the same method as equation 1, but is restricted to single mothers. 
The experimental group is those with 2 or more children, while the comparison group is made up 
of those with exactly 1 child. In this case, we use 1995 as the base year. 
Our multivariate models take three forms. We first estimate ordinary least squares models 
using the outcome of unsecured debt in real dollars (adjusted for inflation). We use real dollars 
because it is the most direct way to measure the impact of the EITC.6 Because of concerns that 
outliers may be driving our results, we also utilize two additional specifications: 1) quantile 
regression at the 75 percentile, which will be unmoved by extreme values at either end of the 
distribution of the outcome (Meyer & Sullivan, 2004); and 2) models in which the dependent 
variable is converted using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation. IHS can be used to 
reduce the influence of outliers, and can be interpreted similarly to models using the more 
common natural log transformation (in which point estimates indicate percentage change rather 
than change in real dollars). IHS offers an added benefit of allowing the dependent variable to 
take positive, negative, and zero values (Burbidge, Magee & Robb, 1988).7,8 All regressions are 
                                                
6 We hypothesize that the EITC will have a direct impact over time on the difference in the real dollar value between 
the mean unsecured debt of the experimental group and the control group. The impact of the EITC on the ratio 
between these two measures will be less straighforward. Take the following example: let’s assume that prior to the 
EITC expansions, single mother households have an average unsecured debt of $3,500 and single childless women 
have an unsecured debt of $4,000 ($500 difference, ratio 88%). In the first year after the EITC is implemented, the 
value for single mothers falls to $3250, while the value for single childless women increases to  $4,500 ($1,250 
difference, 72%). But in the second year after implementation, the unsecured debt of single mothers is $4,250, while 
the value is $5,500 for single childless women. In this case, the difference-in-difference estimate in real dollars is the 
same (500 - $1250 = $750), but the estimate in terms of  the ratio narrows (.88-.77).  
7 The IHS transformation function is 𝑔 𝑦! , 𝜃 = log 𝜃𝑦! + 𝜃!𝑦!! + 1 ! ! 𝜃 = sinh!!(𝜃𝑦!) /𝜃. In STATA, the 
estimated function of IHS transformation is asinh(x) = ln{x+sqrt(x*x + 1)}. That is, theta is equal to 1. 
8 We also examined the density of values for unsecured debt for the two groups, using the kernel density estimator. 
The densities for the two groups appear to have very similar shapes and ranges of values over the years. Zero values 
account for a relatively big proportion of the observations, so using IHS allows us to include all the values of the 
dependent variable, while also reducing the effects of the outliers. 
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run unweighted, although they were also run with weights, and the results did not change 
substantively. 
Descriptive Results 
Our pooled sample yields 49,251 observations of single women between the ages of 19 
and 55 for the period 1988 to 1999. Among them, 16,425 are single mothers and 32,826 single 
childless women.9 Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics of the sample at our starting 
(1988) and ending points (1999). Single mothers are far more likely to be black or of Hispanic 
origin than single childless women. Single mothers are also less likely to have a college degree 
than single childless women. Both groups become less likely to be non-Hispanic white over the 
study period. The most noticeable change between the two periods is the growth in the 
proportion of single mothers who are working, from 57.9 in 1988 to 74.5 percent in 1999. This 
change was driven in part by the EITC expansions under study, along with other factors (Meyer 
and Rosenbaum, 2001). The labor force participation of single childless women also increases 
over the two periods, but less dramatically, from 72.9 to 76.3 percent. 
 Table 2 reports the mean unsecured debt levels of households with single women by year 
for the study period 1988-1999, with four panels reporting on (1) all single women, (2) low-
educated single women with a high school diploma or less, (3) household heads, and (4) a final 
panel restricted to single mothers by number of children.10 
 Estimates from the first three panels generally suggest that the unsecured debt of single 
mothers fell relative to single childless women following the expansions of the EITC. Examining 
panel 1, in 1988, the mean unsecured debt of single mothers was $1,658 less than and about 65 
                                                
9 Note that 1998 is not included, see footnote 4. 
10 We do not report median levels of unsecured debt because only about half of households of single mothers report 
any unsecured debt, thus making medians uninformative. In multivariate analyses we take this into account by 
estimating both a quantile regression model at the 75th percentile, and a model in which the dependent variable is 
transformed using IHS. 
page 12 
percent of the mean level of unsecured debt held by households of single childless women. By 
1996, the difference between these two means had risen to $3,883 less, and the ratio between the 
two groups was 50 percent. It should be noted that the unsecured debt values move around 
considerably from year-to-year. Still, there appears to have been a marked shift in the unsecured 
debt of single mothers relative to single childless women. In the first three years of our study 
period, which might be considered “pre-EITC expansion,” the average difference in mean 
unsecured debt between single mothers and single childless women was -$1,944, and the average 
ratio between the means of these two groups was 62 percent. If we consider the final three years 
of the study period as “post-expansion” years, the average difference between the means of these 
two groups was -$3,377 and that average ratio was 55 percent. 
 The next panel restricts the sample to low-educated women, and the results are perhaps 
even more striking. From 1988 to 1993, the unsecured debt of low-educated single mothers 
appears to have been converging with that of low-educated single childless women, so that by 
1993, the difference between the mean values for these two groups was only -$249 and the ratio 
between them was 92 percent. In the post expansion years, however, the unsecured debt of single 
mothers relative to single childless women falls considerably, never going below -$1,900, and 
the ratio between the means of the two groups ranges from 40 to 58 percent. 
 Turning to household heads in the bottom left hand panel, while interpretation of the 
results is less straightforward, they still appear to follow the same pattern. In the pre-recession 
years, the average difference between the mean level of unsecured debt of single mothers and 
single childless women was $-1,343, and the ratio between the means of the two groups was 67 
percent. In comparison, in the post-recession years, the mean difference was -$2,842 and the 
average ratio was 56 percent. 
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 It is worth noting that the relative trends observed in table 2 are a result of rising unsecured 
debt among single childless women, and not falling unsecured debt among single mothers. 
Single childless women saw their household unsecured debt grow from $4,738 in 1988 to $7,852 
in 1999 (a 66 percent increase). This trend appears somewhat larger than, although consistent 
with, the overall sample of working-age adults in the U.S., whose household unsecured debt we 
estimate went from $5,883 in 1988 to $8,573 in 1999 (a 46 percent increase). In contrast, 
households with single mothers saw their unsecured debt increase much less, from $3,080 to 
$4,181 (a 26 percent increase). So, if the EITC is having an effect, it is to decrease the growth of 
the unsecured debt of households with single mothers over time from what it would have been 
otherwise. 
 The bottom right-hand panel of table 2 reports on the final descriptive test of our 
hypothesis. As figure 1 shows, the maximum credit available to single mothers with 1 child and 
those with 2 or more children diverge in the final years of our study period, as the credit for 
families with multiple children was expanded. Given the timing of this expansion, we believe 
that if the expanded credit caused a differential change in unsecured debt between these two 
groups of single mothers, this might become evident in 1996 or later. Estimates in table 2 follow 
the hypothesized pattern: between 1988 and 1995, single mothers with 2 or more children appear 
to lose ground in terms of unsecured debt load relative to single mothers with 1 child, so that by 
1995, the difference between the means of the two groups is only -$323. However, between 1996 
and 1999, single mothers with 2+ children saw their household unsecured debt level off, while 
single mothers with 1 child—for whom the EITC credit stagnated between 1994 and 1996—saw 
their household unsecured debt increase from $3,428 in 1995 to $4,922 in 1999. 
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 On the whole, the evidence from table 2 is consistent with the hypothesis that the EITC 
expansions of the early 1990s had a negative effect on the unsecured debt of single mothers. 
However, these estimates do not control for competing factors that may be impacting the 
unsecured debt of single women. 
Multivariate Results 
In table 3, column 1 reports on a linear probability model in which UD is 1 if the 
individual lived in a household with unsecured debt >0. The results show that the probability of 
carrying any unsecured debt for single mothers remained fairly stable relative to single childless 
women, going from a statistically significant 7.1 percentage points less likely in 1988 to 9.7 
percentage points less likely in 1996, and then back to 7.2 percentage points in 1999. None of the 
difference-in-differences interaction terms are statistically significantly different from the 
reference year. This suggests that any relative decline in unsecured debt across this period is 
being driven mainly by a relative reduction of debt among those that carry it, and not a change in 
the relative probability of carrying >0 unsecured debt. 
The next three columns report on OLS models in which the dependent variable is 
unsecured debt in real dollars for (2) all single women; (3) household heads; and (4) low-
educated women. According to estimates from our baseline model presented in column 2, in 
1988 households with single mothers carried a statistically insignificant $165 dollars less in 
unsecured debt than households of single childless women, after controlling for other factors. In 
the pre-EITC years, there was no statistically significant change in this differential. In 1996, 
however, households with single mothers carried $2,796 less in unsecured debt relative to single 
childless women, and the change from the differential between these two groups in the base year 
was statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The differential between single mothers and single 
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childless women remained large and statistically significantly different from 1988 for the final 
two years of the study period. In terms of the unsecured debt of single mothers relative to single 
childless women, there was a substantial and statistically significant change during the post-
EITC expansion years. 
Single mother household heads followed a similar pattern. In 1988, they carried a 
statistically insignificant $58 dollars more in unsecured debt than single childless women, and 
this differential did not change to a statistically significant degree in 1991, 1993, or 1995. In 
1996, however, this differential changed by a statistically significant -$3,132, and remained at 
large and statistically significantly different from the base year for the rest of the study period. It 
is worth noting that the point estimate for 1996 is quite a bit larger than those for 1997 and 1999. 
Still, even an average of the three post-EITC expansion years, compared to an average of the 
three pre-expansion years, suggests a marked shift in the unsecured debt of single mothers 
relative to single childless women. Column 4 restricts the sample to low-educated women with a 
high school degree or less. During the period 1988 to 1995, the unsecured debt of low-educated 
single mothers converged with that of their childless counterparts. This trend reversed course in 
1996-1999. However, the change in this differential is only statistically significantly different 
from the base year in 1997. 
 Column 5 of table 3 reports on a model using quantile regression at the 75th percentile. 
This is to ensure that the results in the OLS models are not being driven by a few extreme values. 
Our quantile regression results are robust and in fact more stable than our OLS model. At the 
75th percentile, household with single mothers saw their unsecured debt go from $483 less than 
the households of single childless women in 1988 to $1,589 less in 1995, then remained virtually 
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unchanged at about -$2,500 for the remainder of the study period. The post-EITC expansion 
point estimates are highly statistically significant. 
Column 6 of table 3 reports on a final model in which unsecured debt is transformed 
using IHS.11  Based on the point estimates of IHS regressions and the calculated average values 
of real unsecured debt of all single women (reported in table A.1), we can see that the baseline 
trends still hold. Households with single mothers carried a statistically significant $2,585 less in 
unsecured debt in 1988 than households with single childless women and this differential 
remained substantively similar and not statistically significantly different during the pre-EITC 
years. There was a statistically significantly large increase in the differential in 1995 and 1996, 
and the differential remained elevated in 1997 and 1999, although not statistically significantly 
different from 1988 in these years. 
Table 4 reports on results from our second difference-in-differences comparison. As 
previously mentioned, our hypothesis would predict that single mothers with 2 or more children 
would reduce their unsecured debt relative to single mothers with just one child during the years 
following the EITC increase targeted at families with multiple children. Our OLS and quantile 
regression results are consistent with this hypothesis. For the OLS model in column 1, our 
reference year is 1995, the calendar year before single mothers with multiple children would 
have received the expanded credit. From 1988 to 1995, the difference in unsecured debt carried 
by single mothers with 2 or more children converged with that of single mothers with exactly 1 
                                                
11 The IHS regression equation when  𝜃 = 1can be written as  log 𝑦 + 𝑦! + 1 = 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀, and 𝛽 = 𝜕log  (𝑦 + 𝑦! + 1) 𝜕𝑥=(1 𝑦! + 1) 𝜕y 𝜕𝑥, and therefore, 𝜕y 𝜕𝑥 =𝑦! + 1 ∗ 𝛽. So the estimated impact of whether being a single mom in year t on the IHS transformed real 
unsecured debt is the IHS point estimate times the square root of the squared mean unsecured debt plus one. In this 
sense, the advantage of the IHS regression is that it can reduce the effects of the outliers like the natural log 
transformation while also allowing for the inclusion of zero values and an interpretation of the point estimates that is 
similar to the real value regressions since the estimates take into account the average values of the dependent 
variables. 
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child, so that in 1995, the difference between the two groups was a statistically insignificant 
$181. As with the models in table 3, however, this trend reverses during the post-EITC 
expansion years. Relative to single mothers with just one child, the unsecured debt of single 
mothers with multiple children falls $1,649 between 1995 and 1996, and remains at a similar 
level in 1997 (the point estimate in 1999 is statistically insignificant). The quantile regression 
results (reported in column 2) tell a similar story. The difference in the unsecured debt of single 
mothers with one child and those with multiple children at the 75th percentile does not change to 
a statistically significant degree between 1988 and 1995, but does change in the post-expansion 
years, remaining statistically significantly and substantively lower than the base year through 
1999. Finally, column 3 reports on a model in which unsecured debt has been transformed using 
IHS. The results are inconclusive because the point estimates are not statistically significant. 
However, they do seem to indicate that the unsecured debt of single mothers with multiple 
children was increasing in the pre-EITC expansion years relative to single mothers with 1 child, 
and decreased in 2 of the 3 post-EITC expansion years. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We undertook numerous sensitivity tests of the robustness of our findings. If the effects 
we have identified are related to the EITC expansions, we would expect them to be concentrated 
among working women. In an attempt to test this, we restricted our sample only to women who 
were working in the month of observation. (This is not a perfect test, since EITC benefits are 
based on annual earnings from a calendar year prior to the observation month). We found that 
the effect we identified was concentrated among working women. The difference-in-differences 
point estimates from a model of non-workers were statistically insignificant. We also wanted to 
test the possibility that changing rates of post-secondary school enrollment and student debt may 
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be driving our results. To test this, we added an indicator of current school enrollment, and our 
results remained substantively similar. In an attempt to control for co-habitation, we added a 
variable for the number of adults in the household, and one for the number of single mothers in 
the household. As might be expected, the number of adults in the household variable appears to 
be important, with each additional adult being associated with an increase in household 
unsecured debt. Still, interpretation of the year*single mother terms remains similar to models 
presented in table 3.  
Finally, we wanted to examine whether the relationships we have identified were 
consistent across the various types of unsecured debt. While the data do not allow us to run our 
multivariate models with these sub-categories as outcomes because of sample size limitations, 
we replicated our descriptive estimates from table 2 for all single women for the three sub-
categories 1) credit card debt; 2) unsecured bank loans; and 3) all other unsecured debts 
(medical, bank bills, loans owed to private individuals, and other unsecured debts). It appears as 
though the relationships we have identified in the preceding analyses are concentrated in the last 
two sub-categories, and do not appear for credit card debt.  
Study Limitations 
One concern is that our results are largely based on the changes in estimates that occurred 
between SIPP panels with different samples. While our findings from two different difference-
in-differences tests fit with our hypothesis, it is also possible that the results are being driven by 
changes in the sample structure, or data collection procedures. However, the Asset and Liabilities 
topical module questions remained consistent across the panels, and previous research has 
pooled data from these topical modules from the 1996 panel with earlier panels (Sullivan, 2006). 
This concern also highlights the strength of the differences-in-differences approach. For changes 
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in the survey between panels to affect our results, it would have had to impact single childless 
women differentially from single mothers. Otherwise, the comparative method neutralizes this 
concern. Further, while we cannot completely rule out the possibility that our findings are an 
artifact of the data, it is worth noting again that evaluations have found that the SIPP does a 
comparatively good job of capturing the wealth of low-income households (Czajka et. al, 2003; 
Ratcliffe et. al, 2008). Also, our findings are robust across a number of tests including all single 
women, low-skilled single women, working single women, and single mothers by number of 
children. 
Perhaps our results are a result of biased unsecured debt estimates for single childless 
women in the later years of the sample, specifically for the jump in unsecured debt of single 
childless women between 1995 and 1996. Because of this concern, we compared the estimates 
for single childless women to single childless men, and found that the change between the 
periods for these two groups were quite similar (means for single childless women are $5486 in 
1991; $5421 in 1995; and $7778 in 1996. Means for single childless men are $5683 in 1991; 
$5215 in 1995; and $7568 in 1996.) In table 2, we find an immense jump in unsecured debt for 
low-educated single childless women between 1995 and 1996, which is of concern. However, the 
standard error for the 1996 mean for this smaller sub-group is quite large (1,860), making the 
estimate inefficient (and somewhat larger than the jump experienced by low-educated single 
childless men). This is why we focus our main analyses on the larger population of single 
women, and control for education in our main multivariate models.  
A final concern is that changes in other policies during our study period may have 
differentially affected single mothers relative to single childless women, and may be driving our 
results. We have tried to mitigate this concern by utilizing two difference-in-differences tests, 
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one in particular that compares single mothers by number of children. We also include controls 
for the implementation of a welfare waiver program and a TANF program in our multivariate 
models. Still, this is a limitation of our work. We focus our analysis on the EITC because there is 
a theoretical and empirical basis for the hypothesis that it might be negatively associated with 
unsecured debt. 
Discussion 
  The early 1990s was a period of substantial growth in unsecured debt across the 
population as a whole, and especially among poor households. It was also a period of substantial 
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which has grown into the major income-
maintenance program in the U.S. targeted toward low-income working families with children. 
During the period 1988 to 1999, we find that households with single mothers bucked the national 
trend of rising unsecured debt. We believe our results support the findings of existing non-
representative household surveys, which suggest that EITC recipients use a sizable portion of 
their EITC to pay down unsecured debt, which includes credit card debt, past-due bills, debt to 
pay day loan providers, and other debts. This was during a period in which single mothers were 
1) increasing their labor market activity, 2) in which unsecured debt was becoming more easily 
accessible to low-educated individuals, and 3) the consumption of single mothers was increasing, 
which would have likely led to upward pressure on unsecured debt. 
If the EITC does in fact allow single mothers with children to pay down their unsecured 
debt—or allows them to avoid added debt—we believe it is making a significant contribution in 
the financial stability of these households. Today, in the midst of the economic crisis and 
increased insecurity in both employment and financial markets, the importance to families of 
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stabilizing one’s finances by reducing debt or increasing savings has become even more 
apparent. 
Existing research suggests that recipients view their EITC differently from their labor 
market earnings, indeed, they appear to prefer the lump-sum delivery which makes the program 
unique. They appear to like the process of allocating their dollars in ways that they feel 
maximizes the utility of their families (Romich & Weisner, 2000; Mendenhall et al., 2010). If 
policymakers are interested in encouraging asset building among recipients, they will have to 
explore initiatives that raise the benefits of savings for these families—making it more attractive 
to allocate a larger amount to savings—or raise the costs of borrowing unsecured debt. Indeed, it 
likely makes the most economic sense for poor families to allocate proportionately more to 
unsecured debt reduction, debt which may be borrowed at a high interest rate, before shoring up 
household savings, which may yield a smaller return. This may be the best decision in terms of 
the financial stability and possible future asset development of these families. Still, it is hard to 
claim that paying down debt is a form of asset building. Thus, while we believe our results lend 
support to findings that households with single mothers allocate a significant portion of the EITC 
benefits to paying down debt, they lend further doubt to the notion that the EITC is serving as a 
wealth generator.  
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Source: Tax Policy Center 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=36 
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Table 1    
Characteristics of Single Women Ages 19-55, 1988 & 1999 
Means       
 Single Mothers 
Single Women, No 
Children 
  1988 1999 1988 1999 
Race and Ethnicity     
White, Non-Hispanic 56.9 52.1 77.9 70.8 
Black 30.6 30.7 13.7 16.5 
Amer Indian, Eskimo or Aleut 1.0 2.0 0.5 1.5 
Asian or Pacific Islander 1.0 2.3 3.0 3.7 
Hispanic Origin 12.8 14.7 6.1 8.4 
Age 33.7 34.8 31.0 34.4 
Employed 57.9 74.5 72.9 76.3 
Education     
< High School Degree 28.5 23.2 14.0 14.6 
High School Graduate Only 38.6 35.9 28.2 27.1 
College Graduate 21.1 21.6 33.9 32.3 
Family Income (% FPL) 177 194 325 360 
N     
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the SIPP Assets and 
Liabilities topical modules. All estimates are weighted. 
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Table 2     
Total Household Unsecured Debt of Single Women Age 19-55, 1988-1999 
Means 2005$          
Year Mothers 
Childless 
Women 
(1) – (2) 
(1) / (2) Mothers 
Childless 
Women 
(4) – (5) 
(4) / (5) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Single Women  Low-educated Single Women  
1988 $3,080 $4,738 -$1,658 $1,929 $3,218 -$1,289 
 (334) (305) 65% (322) (236) 60% 
1991 3,168 5,486 -2,318 2,130 3,261 -1,131 
 (276) (282) 58% (221) (261) 65% 
1993 3,164 5,020 -1,856 2,741 2,990 -249 
 (428) (271) 63% (650) (163) 92% 
1995 3,263 5,421 -2,158 1,742 3,320 -1,578 
 (338) (317) 60% (162) (348) 52% 
1996 3,895 7,778 -3,883 2,560 6,436 -3,876 
 (187) (724) 50% (254) (1,860) 40% 
1997 4,326 6,903 -2,577 2,599 4,509 -1,910 
 (295) (282) 63% (220) (278) 58% 
1999 4,181 7,852 -3,671 2,728 4,716 -1,988 
 (288) (510) 53% (249) (247) 58% 
       
Household Heads   Single Mothers by Number of Children 
 Mothers 
Childless 
Women 
(7) – (8) 
(7) / (8) 2+ Children 1 Child 
(10) – (11) 
(10) / (11) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1988 2,747 3,682 -$935 2,283 3,764 -$1,481 
 (330) (251) 74% (383) (431) 61% 
1991 2,796 4,443 -1,647 2,710 3,585 -875 
 (300) (247) 63% (291) (440) 76% 
1993 2,516 3,957 -1,441 2,589 3,708 -1,119 
 (316) (227) 64% (255) (858) 70% 
1995 3,379 4,518 -1,139 3,105 3,428 -323 
 (417) (324) 75% (493) (370) 91% 
1996 3,208 7,180 -3,972 3,046 4,671 -1,625 
 (167) (1,264) 45% (274) (233) 65% 
1997 3,749 5,833 -2,084 3,173 5,383 -2,210 
 (358) (282) 64% (310) (453) 58% 
1999 3,621 6,093 2,472 3,384 4,922 -1,538 
 (337) (294) 59% (444) (327) 69% 
      
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the SIPP Assets and Liabilities 
topical modules. All estimates are weighted. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
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Table 3       
Multivariate Results: Household Unsecured Debt of Single Women, Ages 19-55, 1988-1999 (2005$) 
  
LP Model 
(0,1) 
All Single 
Women 
Household 
Heads 
Low-Educated 
Women 
Quant Reg 
75th Percentile IHS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Single mother -0.071*** -164.82 57.91 -858.85** -483.31 -0.622*** 
 (0.019) (334.0) (272.8) (353.9) (396.8) (0.158) 
Single Mother*1991 -0.010 -162.20 28.95 81.50 -823.96* -0.177 
 (0.025) (919.5) (1,129.6) (533.6) (475.6) (0.210) 
Single Mother*1993 0.005 -408.05 -530.28 969.04 -488.16 -0.011 
 (0.020) (600.2) (486.3) (784.2) (454.7) (0.178) 
Single Mother*1995 -0.024 -801.03 -186.52 -346.76 -1,105.41** -0.298* 
 (0.016) (657.8) (719.9) (477.8) (496.5) (0.151) 
Single Mother*1996 -0.026 -2,631.25*** -3,132.00*** -2,189.69 -2,193.74*** -0.348** 
 (0.019) (580.9) (1,019.3) (1,326.2) (443.7) (0.168) 
Single Mother*1997 -0.017 -1,552.47*** -1,589.48*** -788.04* -1,927.63*** -0.250 
 (0.022) (464.2) (490.4) (412.1) (449.7) (0.180) 
Single Mother*1999 -0.001 -2,266.85*** -1,632.70*** -527.56 -2,009.38*** -0.154 
 (0.025) (685.1) (547.8) (490.19) (458.5) (0.226) 
Race & Ethnicity       
White --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Black -0.130*** -1,605.22*** -1,400.14*** -1,753.87*** -1,623.55*** -1.148*** 
 (0.011) (202.3) (265.5) (251.3) (115.6) (0.098) 
Amer. Ind, Esk, Aleut -0.101*** -958.22 905.72 -1,354.17** -1,907.45*** -0.926*** 
 (0.024) (1,175.4) (2,096.8) (569.8) (423.8) (0.223) 
Asian or Pacific Isl. -0.110*** 597.30 1,264.024 1,102.69** 137.25 -0.849*** 
 (0.014) (599.0) (936.0) (480.0) (262.6) (0.130) 
Hispanic Origin -0.134*** -1,761.94*** -1,491.58*** -1,725.42*** -1,622.73*** -1.250*** 
 (0.017) (197.0) (306.2) (325.0) (150.8) (0.152) 
College 0.172*** 3,244.73*** 3,017.00***  4,198.45*** -1.148*** 
 (0.006) (282.7) (386.7)  (91.7) 1.729*** 
Ages      (0.058) 
20-25 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
25-34 -0.033*** -430.92 818.95*** -424.33* -786.16*** -0.314*** 
 (0.007) (286.8) (288.9) (217.4) (121.7) (0.072) 
35-44 -0.058*** -1,730.32*** 64.89 -882.79*** -1,682.36*** -0.635*** 
 (0.006) (266.4) (285.9) (214.7) (126.6) (0.061) 
45-55 -0.082*** -1,965.21*** 227.25 -635.33 -1,992.04*** -0.878*** 
 (0.006) (367.1) (502.5) (626.1) (130.0) (0.061) 
Welfare Prog Changes       
Wavier Implemented 0.676*** -464.64 -464.41 64.36 -271.79** -0.061 
 (0.015) (322.8) (372.7) (277.0) (122.9) (0.118) 
TANF Implemented 0.676*** 419.91 605.54 1,312.40 -630.69*** -0.275** 
 (0.015) (726.8) (952.8) (1,372.2) (202.7) (0.121) 
Year       
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1988 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1991 0.004 889.62** 1,001.32*** 293.67 722.57*** 0.114 
 (0.015) (401.8) (342.2) (363.4) (264.7) (0.136) 
1993 -0.025 488.04 414.34 -208.53 307.55 -0.173 
 (0.018) (354.4) (361.2) (342.9) (253.1) (0.168) 
1995 -0.030* 1,157.61** 1,114.57** 202.93 887.71*** -0.135 
 (0.016) (519.5) (470.6) (506.0) (280.0) (0.139) 
1996 -0.006 3,155.31*** 3,277.95*** 1,853.58*** 2,851.91*** 0.222 
 (0.021) (555.4) (588.8) (652.6) (288.7) (0.189) 
1997 -0.001 2,380.32** 2,002.20* 109.68 2,987.04*** 0.301 
 (0.025) (962.0) (1,190.0) (1,516.7) (334.7) (0.217) 
1999 0.004 3,232.58*** 2,066.81 116.08 3,327.94*** 0.385 
 (0.028) (1,077.5) (1,281.4) (1,578.2) (336.3) (0.247) 
Constant 0.004 4,060.01*** 1,913.31*** 4,333.35*** 5,695.85*** 5.605*** 
 (0.015) (373.1) (311.1) (353.0) (305.8) (0.165) 
Observations 48,501 48,501 27,386 22,935 48,501 48,501 
R-Squared .084 .014 .008 .004  .094 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the SIPP Assets and Liabilities topical modules. Sample restricted to single 
mothers and single childless women, 19-55. 
Notes: All models include region controls. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
page 27 
 
Table 4    
Multivariate Results: Household Unsecured Debt of Single Mothers, Ages 19-55, 1988-1999 
(2005$) 
  All Single Women 
Quant Reg 
75th Percentile IHS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
2 or more children (1995) 180.74 -909.23*** -0.889*** 
 (602.5) (314.1) (0.225) 
2 or more children *1988 -1,488.69* 174.12 0.080 
 (810.19) (521.0) (0.378) 
2 or more children *1991 -1,571.84 150.69 0.380 
 (1,715.5) (416.7) (0.261) 
2 or more children *1993 -1,203.99 528.01 0.218 
 (1,282.32) (392.8) (0.274) 
2 or more children *1996 -1,648.99** -986.40*** -0.108 
 (671.5) (373.9) (0.293) 
2 or more children *1997 -1,801.56** -818.77** 0.134 
 (764.5) (382.7) (0.286) 
2 or more children *1999 -1,171.20 -1,468.32*** -0.113 
 (846.571) (397.0) (0.325) 
Race & Ethnicity    
White --- --- --- 
Black -1,750.73*** -1,649.76*** -1.408*** 
 (233.7) (112.2) (0.102) 
Amer. Ind, Esk, Aleut 253.17 -1,677.37*** -1.229*** 
 (2,821.1) (418.4) (0.315) 
Asian or Pacific Isl. -143.24 -510.34 -0.887*** 
 (694.3) (352.6) (0.248) 
Hispanic Origin -1,415.52*** -1,248.49*** -1.358*** 
 (376.3) (146.7) (0.167) 
College 3,011.98*** 3,773.76*** 1.932*** 
 (247.0) (101.9) (0.127) 
Ages    
20-25 --- --- --- 
25-34 350.03 -207.21 0.002 
 (226.5) (148.9) (0.114) 
35-44 187.39 -105.19 0.209* 
 (239.6) (149.9) (0.111) 
45-55 812.20 352.81* 0.130 
 (775.9) (191.09) (0.153) 
Welfare Prog Changes    
Wavier Implemented -615.59 87.40 0.075 
 (493.5) (134.23) (0.140) 
TANF Implemented 54.12 -250.30 -0.214 
 (351.9) (212.20) (0.157) 
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Year    
1988 266.48 32.71 0.410* 
 (652.4) (361.6) (0.240) 
1991 1,145.45 120.68 0.259 
 (1,689.3) (298.1) (0.241) 
1993 320.65 -310.48 0.154 
 (720.0) (276.1) (0.184) 
1995 ---   
1996 1,225.52** 1,071.68*** 0.252 
 (460.5) (294.2) (0.193) 
1997 1,689.85** 1,277.92*** 0.265 
 (655.0) (345.9) (0.245) 
1999 1,479.24** 1,953.59*** 0.548** 
 (571.8) (353.6) (0.225) 
Constant 3,010.28*** 3,743.33*** 4.432*** 
 (431.7) (356.6) (0.181) 
Observations 16,209 16,209 16,209 
R-Squared 0.014  0.104 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the SIPP Assets and Liabilities topical 
modules. Sample restricted to single mothers and single childless women, 19-55. 
Notes: All models include region controls. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.1     
IHS Models: Calculated Average Values of Real Unsecured Debt and IHS Estimates 
 
All single women 
(Mean) IHS estimates IHS D-D derivatives IHS derivatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   
all single women 
All single 
women 
Single Mother*1988 4157.331 -0.622*** -2585.17 -2585.17 
Single Mother*1991 4713.052 -0.177 -835.87 -3421.04 
Single Mother*1993 4308.869 -0.011 -49.00 -2634.17 
Single Mother*1995 4613.058 -0.298* -1373.99 -3959.17 
Single Mother*1996 6346.763 -0.348** -2210.66 -4795.84 
Single Mother*1997 6009.752 -0.250 -1504.39 -4089.57 
Single Mother*1999 6637.712 -0.154 -1021.86 -3607.03 
     
 
Single mothers IHS estimates IHS D-D derives IHS derivatives 
   
Single mothers Single mothers 
2 more children*1995 3046.075 -0.889*** -2707.77 -2707.77 
2 more children*1988 3091.214 0.080 246.92 -2460.85 
2 more children*1991 3093.679 0.380 1177.08 -1530.69 
2 more children*1993 3221.334 0.218 703.82 -2003.95 
2 more children*1996 3788.506 -0.108 -407.86 -3115.63 
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2 more children*1997 4319.465 0.134 577.49 -2130.28 
2 more children*1999 4168.098 -0.113 -471.43 -3179.20 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the SIPP Assets and Liabilities topical modules. Sample 
restricted to single mothers and single childless women, 19-55. 
Notes: IHS D-D estimates are calculated using  𝜕y 𝜕𝑥 = 𝑦! + 1 ∗ 𝛽, where, y is the real values of 
unsecured debt and x is independent variable. All models include region controls. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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